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Performance of Controlling Rape in India: Efficiency Estimates across States 
 




This paper addresses the performance of Indian states in controlling sexual assault or 
rapeon the basis of the data published bythe National Crime Record Bureau in Indiaon the rape or 
sexual assault control performances of 28 major Indian states. The relative efficiencies of the states 
are evaluated by applying stochastic frontier analysis on two decadal periods, ending in 2001 and 
2011. Among the Indian states, although Kerala is recognised as the region where women are very 
progressive, our findings suggest that, unfortunately, the performance of the state in controlling 
sexual assault is not impressive. On the contrary, Gujaratseems to be the most efficient state in 
controlling rape. The results also show that not all states with better rape control instruments have 
efficient control over sexual assault. The study concludes that investment only to improvelaw and 
order would not result in better control of sexual assault. Efficient management of the investments 
in the crime-control instruments along with improvement in social indicators, viz. female 
education, a favourable sex ratio, etc., are required for efficient control of sexual assault. 
 
Keywords: Rape or Sexual Assault, Decadal Panel Data, Efficiency, Stochastic Production 





“If there is humanity in this country, this case has to be seen with such eyes. It’s not just 
me that has lost a daughter. Hindustan kibetibhithiwoh (She was a daughter of 
India).”2Muhammad Yusuf Pujwala, father of the eight-year-old girl AsifaBano. 
 
AsifaBano was an eight-year-old girl of Rasana village near Kathua in the Indian state of 
Jammu and Kashmirwhen she was gang-raped and then murdered by the culprits. This horrible 
incidentoccurredbetween the10thand 12thof January 2018. The “Nirbhaya” rape incident 
on16December,2012 was an eye-opener forthe government of India, which then assured its 
citizens that it would be the last case of that type. The “brutal” “Nirbhaya” rapists were hanged 
todeath with theintentionofstopping crimes of this intensity. But unfortunately, for millions of 
Indian women, “Nirbhaya” was not the last example of brutality. India saw a new chapter of 
brutality referred to as “AsifaBano.” Unfortunately, these are not the only two serious cases of 
crimes against women and girls in India. 
                                                          
1Shrabanti Maity is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Assam University (A Central University) and teaches 
Women’s Studies, Statistical Methodology, Econometrics, Mathematical Economics and Frontier Production 
Function at the postgraduate level and Research Methodology in the pre-PhD course work level. She has published 
22 papers in various internationally and nationally reputed journals. She has supervised four PhDs and three MPhil 
dissertations. She has also authored a book entitled, A Study of Measurementof Efficiency. 
2Times of India, 15/04/2018. 
 181 
Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol. 20, No. 7  August 2019 
The new Indian Constitution, established after independence, passed several acts to protect 
the dignity of Indian women. But even in the twenty-first century, India witnesses gender-selective 
abortions based on the preference for a baby boy. As a consequence of this gender discrimination, 
the current sex ratio for India is 940 women per thousand men (Census, 2011). Gender 
discrimination is itself a form of violence against women. In fact, an overly simplistic view of 
gender inequality as rooted in statistics of violence against women overlooks the pervasiveness of 
discrimination rooted in Indian society, which is based on strong patriarchal norms. In fact, 
“patriarchal values and practices manifest themselves both in high levels of violence and in a 
strong preference of male children” (Dreze and Khere, 2000). The existence of the dowry system 
reduces the status of women in Indian society as one manifestation of gender discrimination, which 
gives birth to different forms of violence against Indian women, including sexual assault. While 
women may be victims of multiple crimes that are rooted in gender inequality, the “Crime in India” 
Report (2015) has defined crimes against women as: “…only the crimes which are directed 
specifically against women i.e. gender specific crimes, characterised as crimes against women. 
This characterization overlooks the gender dynamics of crimes such as murder and robbery for 
which men are also victims. However, various new pieces of legislation have been introduced, and 
amendments have been made to existing laws with a view to handle these crimes effectively. These 
are broadly classified under two categories: 
 
1. Crime Heads under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 
a) Rape (Sec. 376 IPC)3 
b) Attempt to commit Rape (Sec 376/511 IPC) 
c) Kidnapping & Abduction of Women (Section 363, 364, 364A, 365, 366 to 369 IPC)  
d) Dowry Deaths (Section 304B IPC) 
e) Assault on Woman with Intent to Outrage Her Modesty (Sec. 354 IPC)  
f) Insult to the Modesty of women (Sec. 509 IPC) 
g) Cruelty by husband or his relatives (Sec. 498A IPC) 
h) Importation of Girl from Foreign Country (up to 21 years of age) (Sec. 366 B IPC) 
i) Abetment of Suicide of Women (Sec. 306 IPC) 
2. Crime Heads under the Special & Local Laws (SLL) 
Special Acts enacted for protection and safety of women have been clubbed under SLL. 
These gender specific laws in which criminal cases recorded by police throughout the 
country are: 
(i) The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 
(ii) The Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 
(iii)The Commission of Sati Prevention Act, 1987 
(iv) The Protection of women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 
(v) The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956” “Crime in India” Report (2015). 
 
As pointed out by “Crime in India” (2015), rape alone covers 1.2 percent of the total 
cognizable IPC crimes in 2015. Considering the Indian population size as well as the severity of 
this crime, we can identify the seriousness of “rape or more broadly, sexual assault” in India. 
Thusthis paper involvesa detailed discussion of “rape or sexual assault” in India and includes the 
                                                          
3Excludes child rapes registered under the section 4 & 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act 2012 
which published separately in Chapter-6. 
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following sections: pertinent literature in the field, methodology, data and specification of 




Violence against women has been recognised as a significant social issue at the global level 
and has received considerable attention. This is because violence against women has involved both 
social and economic costs. Economic costs include the value of goods and services for treating 
and preventing violence, whereassuch violence imparts emotional costs from the social point of 
view (Kazi, 2012). Between 2008-2012 in India, crimes against women finally became a serious 
concerndue to the continuous increase in the rate of total cognizable crimes against women. As 
reported by NCRB, the rate of “total cognizable crimes against women”in 2008 was 17.0 percent, 
while the figure rose to 41.7 percent in 2012. In spite of these horrific numbers, the reported figures 
do not reflect the actual reality (Gupta, 2014). Krishnaraj (2007) has classified violence as both 
visible and invisible, or camouflaged, in moral terms and it is always a coercive instrument to 
uphold or enforce cultural codes of honour. At present, the most significant problems faced by 
Indian society are domestic violence and sexual assault against women (Bhattacharyya, 2015). 
Gender-based violence, especially violent crimes like rape, is a multifaceted problem. To 
address this, it is essential to tackle various other concurrent issues that act as contributing factors 
and thus play an equally important role (Himabindu et al., 2014). The stringent laws and strict 
punishments are important to deter people from committing rape, perhaps the most violent crime 
against women, but the actual solution to this problem is much more than just promulgation 
(Himabindu et al., 2014). After the “Nirbhaya” rape case of 16 December 2012, the definition of 
rape was reframed in the “Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.” In the “Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act, 2013” under IPC section 375, the crime “rape or more broadly, sexual assault” 
is redefined and the punishment for such a crime is stated under IPC section 376.  But 
unfortunately, the situation didn’t change so much. There is no doubt that the “Nirbhaya” rape case 
marked a turning point in the discourse about crimes against women in India (Verma et al., 2017). 
Unfortunately, this is not the first and only serious case of crime against women in India. Rape or 
sexual assault is a crime that has long been fraught with the accumulated cultural baggage of 
socially defined gender norms and how sexuality ought to be expressed or withheld in given 
situations (Lodhia, 2015). In fact, Taslitz (1999) notesthatrape and sexual assault have strong 
socio-cultural roots that will condition how social institutions, including police stations, 
courtrooms and correctional facilities and their personnel, respond to these crimes, even extreme 
ones. The “Nirbhaya” situation led to modifications to the Indian criminal justicesystem and 
became an example of “how extreme events help drive changes to the system in a large democracy, 
yet an economically developing one” (Kadyan and Unnithan, 2017). 
In addition to rape, another common form of violence against women is sexual 
victimization in public spaces. Madan and Nalla (2016) have urged the government to display 
visible signs in public spaces stating a ‘‘Zero-Tolerance Policy on Sexual Harassment’’ at bus 
stopsand on buses, the metro and roadsides; print media are also encouraged to produce poster 
campaigns about the punishment of such offences mentioning the relevant IPC section (Madan 
and Nalla, 2016). 
Earlier statistical analysis of Indian crime data had concentrated mainly on ratesof crimes 
against women and/or any particular form of crimes against women. Driver (1961) has found that 
caste is an important determinant of crimes against women. In fact, the author found that in 84 
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percent of cases, victims and offenders belonged to the same caste. Nayar (1975) interestingly 
found that “police strength” had a positive correlation with lower crime rates. But this finding has 
to be interpreted with caution, as the study was based only on 18 observations and given the 
possibility of reverse causation. Chaudhuri et al. (2015) identified a positive association between 
crime and urbanization and a negative association between crimes against women and 
opportunities for employment and higher literacy rates. Thus, according to the authors, faster rates 
of urbanization, lower work participation rates for females and lower female literacy ratesare the 
major causes of crime against women in India. Again, Dreze and Khera (2000) on the basis ofthe 
Census district level data concluded that an adverse sexratio is highly and significantly correlated 
with the murder rate of women. However, the authors found no significant relationship between 
murder rates and urbanisation and/or poverty. They have also mentioned that female education 
exercised a moderating influence on criminal violence. 
In aggregates, a number of studies have been carried out to understand the patterns and 
causes of violence against women in India. However, the specific issue of comparative efficiency 
analysis across states in terms of reducing “rape or sexual assault” has not gotten significant 
attention in India. Moreover, the Indian states to date have notundertaken any specific policiesto 
control “rape or sexual assault.” Given this research gap, the aim of this study is twofold:(a) finding 
which of the states is the most efficient with respect to rape control performance and (b) looking 
into rape control instruments and social indicator parameters that have resulted in better 
performance of one state over the other. The female literacy rate, sex ratio, the percentage of 
scheduled-tribe persons in the population, and the percentage of the population below the poverty 
line, etc., are the social indicator variables which are supposed to induce the state to provide better 




Concept and Methodology 
An efficient rape control service is one that achieves its objective at the least cost. The idea 
of an “efficient” rape control facility is derived from the neoclassical production model in which 
agents choose inputs to minimise costs. However, rape control efficiency is conceptualised as the 
“improvement”in the efficiency so that better rape control outcomes can be achieved with given 
resources. One way to do this is to identify those systems that are performing better than others 
and looking into the factors that have induced these systems to perform better. 
The performance of the rape control systems of various states of India can be evaluated by 
estimating the relative efficiency of these states in controlling rape. Two methods can be employed 
to estimate what is achievable: (a) Non-parametric- Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and (b) 
Parametric- Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Both methods have their merits and demerits. The 
major problems with the DEA approach are: 
 
1. The range of the firm’s inefficiency levels cannot be identified properly. 
2. The SFA approach uses more information than the DEA approach. 
 
This approach misleads the investigators to level the “statistical noise” by assuming that 
the “statistical noise” is absent, but this is actually present as the level of inefficiency. 
These prompt us to use the second method to calculate the relative efficiency of the states 
in controlling rape. 
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Farell’s (1957) definition of technical efficiency, that is, the ability to produce the 
maximum possible output from a given set of inputs and state of technology, is similar to the 
definition of rape control system performance. This is because both tend to measure the 
relationship between observed output and the maximum attainable output for the observed inputs, 
that is, what the system achieves compared with its potential. Given the obvious relationship 
between the definition of technical efficiency and the definition of the performance of controlling 
rape, efficiency has been referred to as the system performance in the paper. 
Farell’s (1957) output-based measure sheds light on the differences in output between firms 
when inputs are standardised. Let us assume a generalised non-homogeneous production 
technology and set 0
2 2X X= . 
 




Then, with reference to figure-1, ( )01 2,Y F X X= exhibits the best practice production 
function. Now, if the firm is observed to produce output 
*OY at point P by using *
1OX  input, the 
firm is said to be inefficient. It is clear from the same amount of output 
*OY can be produced by 
utilising lesser units of input **










 and thus, we can identify the corresponding measure of technical 
inefficiency as follows: 
1




= − = =  
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From figure-1 it is also clear that by using the input level, the firm is in a position to produce 
a greateramount of output, that is, the output level *














 can be defined as 
the output increasing measure of technical efficiency. Hence, 
1
TP TR TP PR
TR TR TR
−
− = =  
* ** * * **
** **
, 1




= − = =  
 
is the corresponding measure of technical inefficiency. So, if we consider a non-homogeneous 
production function, we then obtain two separate measures of technical efficiency; but if we 





We start with a simple production function, where rape control outcome Y of the ith (it is 
correct. It should be ith state.) state is a function of access and availability of rape control 
infrastructure and some social inputs (k), denoted by kX s: 
( )it i kitY A F X= (1) Where iA  is the level of productivity, which is assumed to vary across 
states as each state is a distinct identity and utilises infrastructure differently even in similar 












1....   1....i N and t T = =        
 (2a) 
Here iindexes states and tindexes time periods. Following Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977), the disturbance is assumed to be of the form: 
it it itV U = −             (2b) 
Thus, the stochastic production function for the panel data becomes 
( )it kit it ity X V U= + −          (3) 
where ity  is the logarithm of the output of the i th−  state in the t th− time period. kitX  is a (1xk) 
vector of values of known functions of inputs of production and other explanatory variables 
associated with the i th−  firm at the t th−  observation.  is a (kx1) vector of unknown parameters 
to be estimated. 
itV  is distributed as ( )20, VN   and captures random variation in output due to factors 
outside the control of the state (acts of God, etc.) and independently distributed of the itU s . On 
the other hand, itU s are non-negative random variables associated with the technical inefficiency 
of production, which are assumed to be independently distributed, such that itU  is obtained by 
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truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with mean   and variance 2u and independent of 
the itV , that is, Uit~ N(µ, σu
2)ol output of a state is the reciprocal of the rape rate recorded and the k 
inputs are infrastructures as denoted by numbers of jails, number of policemen (per 100 square km 
of area), total police expenditures (in Rs. Lakhs4), Net State Domestic Product in Rs. Crore5 at 
2004-05 prices (for details check Table 1), etc., and some social indicators variables for the state, 
like the percentage of the population below the poverty line, the female literacy rate, the sex ratio, 
the percentage of scheduled-tribe persons in the population, the female work participation rate, 
urbanization, etc. 
The technical efficiency itU  indicates that the rape control performance of a state must lie 
on or below the frontier yit kit itX V= + . 
Although itU  is unobserved by the econometrician, its permanency implies that the states 
tend to observe itU  and take the level of itU  into account while demanding for infrastructure inputs 
in the future. For example, if this is interpreted as administrative inefficiency, it is quite apt to 
assume that the realisation of these will be known to the state rape controlling administrators and 
would affect their choice of infrastructural inputs. This violates the assumption of a linear model 
of uncorrelatedness of regressors with the error term rendering the estimation inconsistent. 
Most studies on frontier estimation have been cross-sectional, which have their own 
limitations (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). Availability of panel data, that is, repeated observations 
for states or individuals over time, obviates the need for strong distributional assumptions about 
the error term, as is common in cross-sectional studies. This facilitates the estimation of state-
specific technical efficiency. Additionally, the assumption that technical efficiency is independent 
of factor inputs does not have to be imposed. Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) 
were the first to employ panel data to estimate the efficiency frontier. 
The maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of equation (3) has been obtained by using the 
FRONTIER-4.1 programme (Coelli, 1996). The FRONTIER programme gives the estimate of the 
vector  , as well as the scalar 2 2 2  u u vwhere

   

 
= = + 
 
, where   lies between 0 and 1 
depending on the dominance of   and u , respectively. One deficiency of this programme, 
however, is that estimates of technical efficiency for different states for each period are given by 
applying the same exponential trend function on the efficiency estimate for the last period; thus, 
only the trend values are observed, and the state ranking is invariant. 
 
 
Data and Variables 
This section deals with adetailed discussion of the data sources and specifications of the 
variables used for the estimation of the SPF regression. 
 
Data 
This study is entirely based on secondary data. The data for the two decadal periods ending 
in 2001 and 2011, are used for the purpose of this study. The relevant data are compiled from 
various sources, viz.the National Crime Record Bureau, the Census of Indiaand the Handbook of 
                                                          
4A lakh is a unit in the Indian numbering system equal to one hundred thousand.  
5A crore is a unit in the Indian numbering system denotes ten million. 
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Statistics on Indian States. Data are selected for the two decadal time points, 2001 and 2011, and 
are scaled if required. The data of the total rate of rape, the number of jails, the number of 
policemen (per 100 square km of the area), persons arrested under custodial rape and their disposal 
by police and courts during 2001 and 2011and total police expenditure (TPE) in Rs. Lakhs are 
collected from “Crime in India,” published by the National Crime Records Bureau. On the other 
hand, data on the percentage of the population below the poverty line, the female literacy rate, the 
percentage of scheduled-caste persons in the population, the percentageof scheduled-tribe persons 
in the population, the female work participation rate, the sex ratio and the proportion of the 
population living in urban areas, are compiled from the Census of India. Finally, Net State 
Domestic Product in Rs. million at 2004-05 prices is compiled from the Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian States, published by the Reserve Bank of India. 
 
Variables 
In order to measure the efficiency of the Indian states in controlling rape using the 
production function approach, three types of variables are essential. First, it is necessary to identify 
an appropriate outcome indicator that represents the output of the rape control performance of the 
state. Second, it is imperative to measure the rape control system instrument inputs that contribute 
to producing that output; and third, it is necessary to include some non-crime control-system-
instruments (social indicators) determinants of controlling rape. The following sub-section 
explains how the output and input variables are constructed. 
Output Variables: When the objective is to examine the relative performance of the Indian 
states in controlling rape, it will be prudent to consider the total recorded rape rate as the output 
indicator. However, it is assumed that a greater number of recorded rapes is linked with a lower 
level of law and order for the protection of women. Thus, the reciprocal of the total rape rate is 
considered as the output variable for this study. 
Input variables: Regarding input variables, we have considered rape control instruments as 
well as social variables. The input variables can be broadly divided into three categories: rape 
control instruments, socioeconomic indicator variables and social indicator variables. The detail 
specifications, descriptions and the discussion of the variables are presented in Table-1. 
 
 
Table-1: Definition of the Regression Variables 
 
Variable name Definition Discussion 
Output Variable 
Rape Rate of crimes against women in the form of 
rape, recorded under Sec. 376 IPC. “Crime rate” 
for crimes committed against women has been 
calculated using only the female population 
based on mid-year projected female population.  
--- 
ln( )Rape  Natural logarithm of rate of rape committed 









Natural logarithm of the reciprocal of the rate of 
rape committed against women (Sec. 376 IPC). 
It is assumed that a 
greater number of 
recorded rapes is 
linked with a lower 
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level of law and order 
for the protection of 
women. Thus, the 
reciprocal of the total 
rape rate is 
considered as the 
output variable for 
this study 
Input Variables 
Jails Total number of jails in the state. This is a crime 
control instrument. 
Thus, an increase in 





rates of crime 
including rape. 
Poverty Rate of poverty of the state: the percentage of 
the population below the poverty line.  
Economic variable: 
poor women are 
expected to be more 
prone to being victims 
of crime particularly 
rape,because of their 
voicelessness. 
NSDP  Net State Domestic Product in Rs. Crore at 
2004-05 prices (base period). NSDP for the year 
2001 in available Rs. Crore at 1999-2000 prices 
(base period). But for the purpose of this study 
we have converted the base period to 2004-05 
for NSDP figures of 2001. Hence the NSDP 
figures used for the purpose of the study are 
available in Rs. Crore at 2004-05 prices (base 
period) for both 2001 and 2011. It is to be noted 
here that a crore is a unit in the Indian 
numbering system denotes ten million. 
Higher NSDP means 
the state is in a 
position to spend 
more resources to 
maintain law and 
order and thus results 
in less crime, 
including rape. 
FLR Female Literacy Rate, defined as the total 
percentage of the female population of an area 
at a particular time aged seven years or above 
who can read and write with understanding. 
Here the denominator is the female population 
aged seven years or more. 
Social variable: 
higher literacy will 
enable women to 
protest against any 
crime committed 
against themand thus 
helps in reducing 
crime, like rape. 
Police The number of policepersons (per 100 square 
km of the area). 
Crime control 
instrument: helps to 
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reduce any form of 
crime. 
TPE  Total Police Expenditure in Rs. Lakhs. It is to 
be noted here that a lakh is a unit in the Indian 
numbering system equal to one hundred 
thousand.  
Crime control 
instrument: helps to 
reduce any form of 
crime. 
SR 
Sex Ratio: number of women per 1000 men. 
Social variable: 
afavourable sex ratio 
helps in reducing 
rape. 
SC Percentageof scheduled-caste persons in the 
population.  
Social variable: 
included with the 
intention to check 
whether SC women 
are more vulnerable 
to crime or not. 
ST Percentage of scheduled-tribe persons in the 
population. 
Social variable: 
included with the 
intention to check 
whether ST women 
are more vulnerable 
to crime or not. 
FWPR Female work participation rate refers to the 
number of people who are either employed or 
are actively looking for work. 
Thisvariable is 
included with the 




Persons arrested under custodial rape and their 




the number of 
persons arrested 
means greater rape 
control outcome and 
at the same time 
sends amessage to 
society that rapists 
should be punished 
strictly. 
Urban Percentageof the population living in urban 
areas, 2001 and 2011  
Urbanisation is 






labourers, from rural 
and suburban areas to 
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urban areas in search 
of jobs, which makes 
them more vulnerable 
to crime. 








= + + 
 
( ) ( )ln ln( ) lnPoverty NSDP FLRPoverty NSDP FLR  + + +
( ) ( ) ( )ln ln ln ln( ) ln( ) ln( )Police TPE SR SC ST FWPRPolice TPE SR SC ST FWPR     + + + + + +
( ) ln(  ) ln( )Persons Arrested Urban it itPersons Arrested Urban V U + + −     (4) 
where, ln isthe natural logarithm (i.e., to the base e). 
For the purpose of estimation of the model, we used FRONTIER 4.1, developed by Coelli 
(1996) and STATA-11. 
Table-A.1 in the appendices presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables 
across Indian states considering two decadal periods and table-A.2 presents the same for the 




We begin this section with estimates of the random effects GLS and fixed effects (within) 
regression results of equation (4), followed by a discussion of the estimates of efficiencies. 
 
Random-effects GLS and Fixed-effects (within) Regressions 
As we are dealing with panel data, it is customary to specify the nature of the panel data 
and also the type of the effects model which will be applicable for the purpose of regression. Here 
we have utilisedstate-level data from28 states over two decadal periods 2001 and 2011. For each 
cross-section, we have the relevant data covering the two decadal periods2001 and 2011. Thus, we 
have strongly balanced panel data. 
It can be observed from Table 2 that the estimates of fixed effects within and random effects 
GLS regression results are almost similar. The existence of the multicollinearity problems among 
the explanatory variables is checked and the result is presented in table-A.3 in appendices. The 
result suggests that the regression model is not suffering from multicollinearity problem. For the 







 as the dependent variable. In the random effects 
GLS regression model we find that the estimated coefficients of the crime controlling instruments 
like the number of policepersons (per 100 square km of the area), total police expenditure inRs. 
Lakhs and social variables like female literacy rate, sex ratio, the percentage of scheduled-tribe 
population and percentage of people below the poverty line have not only the correct sign but are 
also statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of the economic variable Net State Domestic 
Product in Rs. Crore at 2004-05 prices is also appropriate in the sign and also statistically 
significant. For this analysis we have considered two socioeconomic variables, viz. female work 
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participation rate and urbanization. The sign of the estimated coefficients of the first 
socioeconomic variable is positive whereas the second is negative; both estimators are statistically 
significant. The results reveal that a lower female work participation rate and faster urbanization 
cause an increase in rape incidents. The regression result also reveals that there exists an inverse 
relationship between the number of persons arrested for committing rape and rape incidents, but 
unfortunately the result is statistically insignificant. For the fixed effects within regression model, 
we find that although the estimated coefficients are appropriate in sign, only the number of 
policepersons (per 100 square km of the area), total police expenditure in Rs. Lakhs, sex ratio and 
female work participation rate turn out statistically significant. 
 
Table-2: Random-effects GLS and Fixed-effects (within) Regression Coefficients of 
Production Function of the Performance to Control Rape of Different States (No. of 
Observations: 56) 
 
Dependent variable: LDRape (log of 1/Rape) 
Random-effects GLS Fixed-effects (within) 
Variable Coefficients S.E t-ratio Coefficients S.E t-ratio 
Constant 24.155 16.873 1.43 48.012 43.364 1.11 
ln(Jails) -0.036 0.125 -0.29 -0.277 0.236 -1.17 
ln(Poverty) -0.298*** 0.179 -1.67 -0.445 0.395 -1.13 
ln(NSDP) 0.182*** 0.110 1.65 0.394 0.432 0.91 
ln(FLR) 0.549* 0.189 2.90 0.958*** 0.565 1.70 
ln(Police) 0.170*** 0.096 1.77 0.312* 0.136 2.30 
ln(TPE) 0.229* 0.082 2.79 0.090 0.135 0.67 
ln(SR) -4.018*** 2.454 -1.64 -7.603*** 4.084 -1.86 
ln(SC) -0.086 0.105 -0.82 -0.209 0.220 -0.95 
ln(ST) 0.209* 0.085 2.46 0.190 0.049 3.91 
ln(FWPR) 0.478* 0.209 2.29 0.661* 0.032 20.83 
ln(Persons Arrested) 0.245 0.346 0.71 -0.092 0.458 -0.20 
ln(Urban) -0.225***        0.131 -1.72    -0.519 0.372 -1.39 
2R (Within) 0.532 0.628 
2R (Between) 0.243 0.179 
2R (Overall) 0.287 0.071 
Sigma_u 0.563 1.014 
Sigma_e 0.289 0.289 
Rho 0.791 0.925 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on NCRB data. Note: *, **, *** significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively 
 
The estimated results for these two models suggest that the states with better crime control 
instruments, better execution of the crime control instruments, better social indicators like a high 
female literacy rate, a favourable sex ratio, a higher Net State Domestic Product and a higher 
female work participation rate, have a higher chance for better control of rape. The explanations 
of these results are presented later in the discussion section of this paper after the discussion of the 
maximum likelihood estimates of the frontier model. The table also confirms that the random 
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effects GLS results are better than that of fixed effects within results. The Hausman specification 
test concludes that the Random Effects Model will be appropriate in our case (for details check the 
Mathematical Appendix). 
 
Analysis of Efficiency Levels in Controlling Rape of Different States of India 
This section discusses the results on efficiency obtained from the estimation of the model 
(Equation-4) given in the methodology section. The result is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table-3: Efficiency Estimates for Different States of India 
            Year 
State 
Rape Control Efficiency 
Score 
Efficiency Rank 
2001 2011 2001 2011 
Andhra Pradesh 0.481 0.391 8 8 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.385 0.292 15 15 
Assam 0.181 0.110 28 28 
Bihar 0.533 0.444 7 7 
Chhattisgarh 0.308 0.219 22 22 
Goa 0.295 0.207 24 24 
Gujarat 0.888 0.859 1 1 
Haryana 0.355 0.263 19 19 
Himachal Pradesh 0.314 0.224 20 20 
Jammu & Kashmir 0.479 0.387 9 9 
Jharkhand 0.242 0.160 26 26 
Karnataka 0.725 0.662 2 2 
Kerala 0.310 0.221 21 21 
Madhya Pradesh 0.286 0.198 26 26 
Maharashtra 0.388 0.295 14 14 
Manipur 0.636 0.559 6 6 
Meghalaya 0.380 0.287 16 16 
Mizoram 0.182 0.111 27 27 
Nagaland 0.650 0.575 4 4 
Orissa 0.362 0.269 18 18 
Punjab 0.477 0.385 10 10 
Rajasthan 0.377 0.284 17 17 
Sikkim 0.421 0.328 11 11 
Tamil Nadu 0.645 0.569 5 5 
Tripura 0.297 0.209 23 23 
Uttar Pradesh 0.392 0.299 13 13 
Uttaranchal 0.689 0.620 3 3 
West Bengal 0.418 0.325 12 12 
Mean Efficiency 




Source: Author’s own calculation based on NCRB data 
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With the help of table-3, we will investigate our main objective: the comparison of the 
performance of Indian states in controlling rape in two decades. The ranking of the states in terms 
of their efficiency scores considering rape incidences are also presented in table-3. As described 
earlier, the relative efficiency scores show how efficiently the states have performed in controlling 
rape in comparison with the most efficient state. The mean efficiency score in the first decadal 
period, 2001, for controlling rape is 0.432 while that in the second decadal period, 2011, is 0.348. 
The panel mean efficiency score considering two decades together is 0.390. This panel mean 
efficiency score is considered as the benchmark of efficiency for each panel as well as for the 
entire study period. This means that whenastate has an efficiency score above the panel mean 
efficiency, we will consider that state as more technically efficient than the others and vice-versa. 
In the first decadal period, Gujarat (0.888) performed most efficiently followed by Karnataka 
(0.725) and Uttaranchal (0.689). These states maintained their efficiency ranking even in the 
second decadal period with efficiency scores 0.859, 0.662 and 0.620, respectively. It is to be noted 
that the level of efficiency is reducing over time even for the most efficient state with a lower 
efficiency score in the second decadecompared to the first.  The state which becomes the worst 
achiever on the list is Assam. Assam’s scores for 2001 and 2011 are 0.181 and 0.110, respectively. 
The state is preceded by Mizoram and Jharkhand. The same reducing tends in controlling rape 
continued for the worst achiever also. In fact, all the states in the second decadal period performed 
less efficiently with lower efficiency scorescompared to their performance in the first decadal 
period. 
As mentioned earlier, considering the overall mean efficiency score as the benchmark of 
efficiency, we find in the first decadal period out of twenty-eight states, thirteen states performed 
efficiently in controlling rape. This means that in 2001 almost 46 percent of the states performed 
efficiently to control rape. The performances of the states deteriorate in the second decadal period, 
2011, and in aggregate only eight states perform efficiently in controlling rape, which means only 
28 percent of the states efficiently control rape incidences. Again, the mean efficiency for the first 
decadal period, 2001, is 0.432 and for 2011 is 0.348. On the basis ofthe overall mean efficiency 
score, we can conclude that the performances of the states in controlling rape declined in 2011 
compared to 2001. It is to be noted here that the ranking of the states remains same in the two 
decadal periods for controlling rape and the result is obvious because we have usedthe 
FRONTIER-4.1 programme for getting efficiency scores for the states and it is one deficiency of 
this programme that the ranking of the states remain invariant. 
We infer from table-3 that the performances of the Indian states are declining in controlling 
rape. The worst achievers in this respect are two northeastern states, Assam and Mizoram. Among 
the northeastern states of India, Nagaland performs really well to control rape. It needs to be 
remembered that the efficiency ranks only show the relative performance and do not indicate any 
hierarchy in actual rape control outcomes. For example, Uttar Pradesh has arelative efficiency 
scoreof 0.392 and 0.299 inthe first and second decadal time periods, though the mean rape figure 
for Uttar Pradesh is only 1.1, lower than more efficient states. The relative efficiency scores of the 
rape control systems indicate that given its rape controlling investment, the state has attained a 
little more than 39 percent inthe first decadeand 30 percent in the second decadeof its potential in 
reducing rape. The state could have reduced rapeby more than 30 percent if it was as efficient as 
the most efficient state. However, it is important to note that even at the most efficient levels, the 
state could have reduced rape to only 89 percent in the first decadal period and 86 percent in the 
second decadal period and not to a further lower level attained by other efficient states like Gujarat, 
Karnataka and Uttaranchal. This is due to the lower rape controlling inputs used in Uttar Pradesh 
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than in the other above states. Thus, the results should be viewed keeping in mind the fact that 
states differ in their rape controlling system inputs and rape controlling outcomes. It could be said 
that lack of real investment in the rape controlling sector (caused by poor demand as represented 
by literacy and awareness) along with the not-so-efficient performance of rape controlling systems 
are the reason for low levels of rape control outcomes and achievements. Another point to be noted 
here is that although among the Indian states Kerala is always recognised as the most progressive 
region in terms of standard indicators of female position, our findings reveal that the mean rape 
rate in Kerala is 2.6, which is significantly high. Even in our study we find that Kerala is a poor 
performer in controlling rape. In fact, the efficiency scoresof Kerala in controlling rape were 0.310 
and 0.221 in the first and second decadal period, respectively. It is worth mentioning here that our 
findingssupport the earlier study conducted by Chacko (2003). 
 
Analysis of Stochastic Frontier Model 
The stochastic frontier production function in (4) can be viewed as a linearised version of 
the logarithm of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters of the model are obtained by using a modification of the computer program, 
FRONTIER 4.1 (see Coelli, 1996). These estimates, together with the estimated standard errors of 
the maximumlikelihood estimators, given to three significant digits, considering the entire study 




Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol. 20, No. 7  August 2019 
Table-4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Stochastic Production Frontier Function of 
Controlling Rape for Different States of India 
 
Dependent variable: LDRape (Log of 1/Rape) 
Variable Coefficients Estimates S.E t-ratio 
Constant 
0  0.250 0.523 0.478 
ln(Jails) 
1  0.119* 0.014 8.376 
ln(Poverty) 
2  -0.210*** 0.123 -1.709 
ln(NSDP) 
3  0.189*** 0.113 1.682 
ln(FLR) 
4  11.951* 1.007 11.866 
ln(Police) 
5  0.164 0.150 1.090 
ln(TPE) 
6  0.140*** 0.082 1.701 
ln(SR) 
7  -2.149* 0.389 -5.529 
ln(SC) 
8  -0.106 0.115 -0.919 
ln(ST) 
9  0.146*** 0.081 1.797 
ln(FWPR) 
10  0.377*** 0.214 1.762 
ln(Persons Arrested) 
11  0.308 0.327 0.942 
ln(Urban) 
12  -2.171* 0.451 -4.815 
2 2 2ˆ
s u v  = +  
 
0.384* 0.136 2.821 
   0.847* 0.051 16.530 
   1.141* 0.328 3.482 
   -0.257*** 0.134 -1.923 
Log(likelihood) -30.146413 
LR test 23.563777 
Observations 56 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on NCRB data. Note: *, **, *** significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively 
 
It can be observed from the table that the estimates of within, GLS (table-2) and MLE of 
stochastic production frontier show almost similar results. The correlation matrix for the 
independent variables is presented in table-A.3 in the appendices and it confirms that there is no 
multicollinearity problem. From the estimates one can see that the coefficient of the rape control 
instruments likethe number of jails, total police expenditure (in Rs. Lakhs) and the social variables 
like female literacy rate, sex ratio, the percentageof scheduled-tribe persons in the population and 
percentage of population below the poverty line have not only the correct sign but are also 
statistically significant. The economic variable Net State Domestic Product in Rs. Crore at 2004-
05 prices is also statistically significant with the appropriate sign. The estimated coefficients of 
the two socioeconomic variables, viz. the female work participation rate and urbanization are not 
only statistically significant but also appropriate in sign. The sign of the estimated coefficient of 
the variable persons arrested under custodial rape reveals a negative relation between this variable 
and rape committed. But unfortunately, it becomes statistically insignificant. 
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The implication here is that the states with lower poverty rates, favourable sex ratios, higher 
female literacy rates, higher female work participation rates, higher NSDPs and better 
infrastructure for controlling rape in terms of number of jails and total police expenditures (in Rs. 
Lakhs) and higher arrest rates for rape (not statistically significant), have higher chances for better 
rape control outcomes. However, faster urbanization results in higher rates of rape incidents. This 
result is similar to that of Chaudhuri et al. (2015). The results also imply that though the crime 
control instruments like the number of jails and total police expenditure, etc., by themselves ensure 
somewhat better rape control outcomes, these do not reflect better accessibility in terms of social 
accessibility and acceptability of the facilities. In this context, the actual social accessibility and 
acceptability variables like higher female literacy rates, higher female work participation rates and 
favourable sex ratios become important. If two states have similar crime control infrastructure in 
terms of the number of jails and total police expenditure (in Rs. Lakhs), the state with a higher 
female literacy rate, higher female work participation rate and better sex ratio would have the better 
control over rape incidences. To illustrate this further, consider two states, Karnataka and 
Rajasthan, whose average figures for the number of jails and total police expenditures (in Rs. 
Lakhs) are almost identical, but their mean figures for female literacy rate, female work 
participation rate and sex ratio differ considerably. The performances of these two states in 
controlling rape in terms of their efficiency score ranking are second and seventeen in two decades, 
respectively. 
All the variance parameters are significant at the different level and the variance parameter 
( ) is found to be significantly different from zero for a half-normal distribution. The value of 
sigma-square (
2ˆ
s ) is 0.384 and is significant, indicating the correctness of the specified 
assumptions of the distribution of the composite error term. The ratio of state-specific variability 
to total variability ( ) is positive and significant, implying that state-specific technical efficiency 
is important in explaining the total variability of rape incidences. In addition, the ( ) estimate 
associated with the sigma-squared of the technical inefficiency effects is relatively large. The 
estimate of the ( ) parameter is negative, indicatingthat the technical inefficiency effects of the 
sample states increase over time. The value of  in table-5 suggests that in controlling rape 
incidences, the efficiency of the states showed quite a decreasing and statistically significant trend. 
 
 
Discussion, Concluding Remarks and Limitations 
First and foremost, it is important to note that this is perhaps the first attempt to measure 
and comparethe efficiency or performance of the Indian states in controlling rape considering two 
decadal periods. One of the most important findings here is that the performance of the Indian 
states in controlling rape is positively related to the availability of crime controlling instruments, 
such as the number of jails, the number of policemen per 100 square km of an area and total police 
expenditure (in Rs. Lakhs). However, the efficiency of the rape control systems depends on the 
extent of female education in the state and we find female literacy rates inversely influencesrape 
incidences. Other than this, a favourable sex ratio and a lower rate of poverty give voice to the 
woman to protest against any kind of crime, including rape, committed against her. This study also 
reveals that the states with better economic conditions, measured in terms of higher NSDP, 
performed more efficiently to control rape incidences. This maybebecause of the fact that with a 
higher NSDP, the concerned state is in a position to spend more on the safety and security of 
women of that state. We can conclude that the women enjoy a better position in scheduled tribal 
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society compared to others from the inverse relation of ST population and rape incidences. The 
socio-economic variable of the female work participation rate inversely influences rape incidences 
by empowering women to protest against any crime committed against them. Finally, another 
socio-economic variable, urbanization, is positively related to rape. The result is not surprising as 
the faster rate of urbanization is one of the major causes of migrations of labourers, including 
unskilled womenlabourers from rural and suburban areas to urban areas in search of a job. These 
labourers are forced to stay on the outskirts of the urban areas. This act makes women (illiterate or 
less educated) more vulnerable to crime, particularly those who work on construction sites or as 
domestic help. In fact, the relationship between rape and the female work participation rate and 
urbanization, as suggested in this study, is similar to the study by Chaudhuri et al. (2015). 
At the outset, it is indeed a negative aspect that India’s rape controlling outcomes have 
declined over time, as revealed in the increase of the total rape and, also revealed in the decreased 
efficiency scores in the second decade. The increased protection against rape in some special cases 
is not enough to reduce rape. We need time-bound and prominent justice for any crime, including 
rape, committed against women. 
However, unlike the aggregates, which are often deceptive, the disaggregated figures at the 
state level show disparities in terms of area coverage as well as population coverage, adding to the 
inefficient management of the rape control systems. States vary enormously in their levels of crime 
control outcomes, such asfor total crimes against women and particularly in the levels of rape, 
kidnapping and domestic violence. States also differ in their levels of rape control efficiencies, 
which results in varied rape control performances. Differences in female literacy levels (as 
revealed in the study) account for much of such variations. The rate of poverty used as a proxy for 
income seems an important explanatory variable in the regressions designed to control rape 
dispersion. The result is quite obvious. The poor, particularly poor women, are always a soft target 
for crime, in particular, rape, because of their voicelessness, inferior social status and lack of 
knowledge about their human rights. 
It is important to note that contrary to the belief that all the “Bimaru”6 states perform 
poorly, Bihar and Rajasthan are not badly performing states in the efficiency analysis. On the other 
hand, states like Kerala and Maharashtra, which are believed to have improved their rape control 
instruments and social indicators, showed poor efficiency in performance. 
It is also incorrect to say that the most efficient states do not havethe scope to improve 
further in controlling rape. The performance of Gujarat in controlling rape is better only in 
comparison with the other 27 states in the analysis, and though the efficiency/performance of 
controlling rape of this state is impressive, still there is scope for betterment in terms of improving 
utilization of the available rape control instruments. 
The question of how to improve efficiency then becomes paramount and is the main 
concern of developed and developing countries. Since resources are limited, it is important that 
the available resources should be used wisely and efficiently. By reducing waste, inefficiency can 
be reduced and at the same time, it is very important to choose the appropriate mix of interventions. 
On the basis of the existing variations across states in rape control performance, we can suggest 
two critical measures to improve rape control outcomes. The first is to increase the efficiency of 
controlling rape by moving further to the frontier. The second is to create more rape control 
infrastructure, like more employment of women in police force, a separate unitin the police force 
                                                          
6Bimaru is a term coined for states in northern India which have very poor health and human development 
indicators. The literal meaning of the term is ‘sick’. This category includes Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and 
Uttar Pradesh. These states are also identified for higher crime and rape committed against women. 
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to control crimes against women, including rape, and most importantly the judicial system must 
act openly and reach a verdict quickly not only in cases of rape, but any kind of crime committed 
against women. It is always true that justice delayed means justice denied. The increases in 
efficiency as well as providing more prominent and quick action against rape imply that both 
qualitative and quantitative measures are taken for controlling rape. 
Thus, to conclude, this study sought to analyse the performance of 28 major states in India 
in controlling rape. The study has attempted to go beyond the actual attainment levels of Indian 
states to understand the potential levels that the states can achieve. In order to measure 
performance, the study used the stochastic production function method on decadal panel data for 
the periods 2001 and 2011. It was found that not all states with better crime control instruments 
have more efficient rape control systems. Relative efficiencies differ across states not only due to 
differences in the endowments of the rape control instruments, but also due to inefficient utilisation 
of the available instruments. It shows that states should not only increase their investment in 
controlling rape, but also manage it efficiently to achieve better rape control outcomes. Emphasis 
should definitelybe given to improving performance whatever the current level of rape control 
outcomeis. 
It is worth mentioning here that the entire study based on the secondary data on rape rates 
published by NCRB. Thus, we are considering only the recorded crime, but the fact is that in Indian 
family structure, the man is the undisputed ruler of the household, and activities within the family 
are seen as private, which allows violence to occur at home (Niaz, 2003). Moreover, due to some 
understandable reasons such as the attached social stigma, distrust in legal mechanisms, fear of 
retaliation and so on, most crimes against women including rape are unreported (Mukherjee et al., 
2001). Still, in case of the rape victim, there is hesitation to protest because of the fear of losing 
social reputation. Thus, the reported figures fail to reflect the actual situation. The actual numbers 
of incidents are much larger than the reported figure (Gupta, 2014). This is definitely a limitation 
of this study. Moreover, the ranking of the states remains invariant because the efficiency scores 
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Appendices 
 
Table-A.1: Summary Statistics of Rape Rate for Different States 
 
State Mean  SD CV Skewness Maximum Minimum 
Andhra Pradesh 1.45 0.354 24.414 0 1.7 1.2 
Arunachal Pradesh 3 0.000 0.000 0 3 3 
Assam 4.3 1.697 39.465 4.18E-17 5.5 3.1 
Bihar 1 0.141 14.100 -3.90E-17 1.1 0.9 
Chhattisgarh 4.35 0.354 8.138 0 4.6 4.1 
Goa 1.45 0.778 53.655 3.48E-17 2 0.9 
Gujarat 0.65 0.071 10.923 0 0.7 0.6 
Haryana 2.4 0.707 29.458 7.19E-17 2.9 1.9 
Himachal Pradesh 2.25 0.354 15.733 0 2.5 2 
Jammu & Kashmir 1.95 0.354 18.154 -1.42E-16 2.2 1.7 
Jharkhand 2.25 0.212 9.422 0 2.4 2.1 
Karnataka 0.8 0.283 35.375 -3.47E-17 1 0.6 
Kerala 2.6 1.131 43.500 5.29E-18 3.4 1.8 
Madhya Pradesh 4.7 0.000 0.000 0 4.7 4.7 
Maharashtra 1.4 0.141 10.071 -7.59E-18 1.5 1.3 
Manipur 1.35 0.778 57.630 0 1.9 0.8 
Meghalaya 2.75 2.333 84.836 -8.48E-17 4.4 1.1 
Mizoram 6.45 0.919 14.248 0 7.1 5.8 
Nagaland 1.05 0.212 20.190 -2.43E-17 1.2 0.9 
Orissa 2.45 0.354 14.449 0 2.7 2.2 
Punjab 1.45 0.354 24.414 0 1.7 1.2 
Rajasthan 2.25 0.495 22.000 3.58E-18 2.6 1.9 
Sikkim 2.05 0.778 37.951 -3.28E-17 2.6 1.5 
Tamil Nadu 0.8 0.141 17.625 0 0.9 0.7 
Tripura 4.4 1.697 38.568 0 5.6 3.2 
Uttar Pradesh 1.1 0.141 12.818 1.03E-16 1.2 1 
Uttaranchal 1.1 0.283 25.727 -3.46E-17 1.3 0.9 
West Bengal 1.75 1.202 68.686 1.02E-17 2.6 0.9 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on NCRB data 
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Table-A.2: Summary Statistics for Output and Input Variables of the Frontier Model for 
Different States of India 
Variable Mean Median S.D C.V Maximum Minimum 
Rape 2.268 1.900 1.517 66.910 7.100 0.600 








-0.617 -0.642 0.639 -103.562 0.511 -1.960 
Jails 43.821 25.500 47.226 107.769 215.000 1.000 
Poverty 22.505 20.250 11.944 53.070 53.500 5.100 
NSDP  1056.562 653.515 1262.992 119.538 6676.254 12.077 
FLR 62.971 61.000 13.186 20.939 92.100 33.100 
Police 62.079 57.650 42.283 68.113 231.300 6.400 
TPE 1074.478 686.580 1246.500 116.010 6997.470 41.680 
SR 945.125 944.500 43.283 4.580 1084.000 861.000 
SC 12.495 14.009 8.285 66.304 31.936 0.000 
ST 22.437 12.154 27.714 123.519 94.500 0.000 
FWPR 29.118 29.950 8.728 29.976 47.500 13.900 
Persons Arrested 0.393 0.000 1.637 416.649 10.000 0.000 
Urban 28.261 26.070 11.981 42.396 62.170 9.800 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on NCBR and Census data 
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Table-A.3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
ln(Jails)(1) 
1.00            
ln(Poverty) (2) 
0.05 1.00           
ln(NSDP)(3) 
0.67 -0.15 1.00          
ln(FLR)(4) 
-0.15 -0.56 0.11 1.00         
ln(Police)(5) 
-0.22 -0.31 0.10 0.43 1.00        
ln(TPE)(6) 
0.57 0.00 0.75 -0.01 0.07 1.00       
ln(SR)(7) 
0.16 -0.03 0.09 0.47 0.02 -0.10 1.00      
ln(SC)(8) 
0.39 -0.07 0.25 -0.19 0.16 0.36 -0.09 1.00     
ln(ST)(9) 
-0.39 0.10 -0.42 0.19 -0.18 -0.36 0.02 -0.69 1.00    
ln(FWPR(10)) 
-0.03 0.05 -0.26 0.09 -0.55 -0.31 0.11 -0.37 0.56 1.00   
ln(PA)#(11) 
0.17 0.11 0.23 -0.12 0.00 0.56 -0.04 0.12 -0.16 -0.17 1.00  
ln(Urban) (12) 0.19 -0.40 0.45 0.54 0.25 0.15 0.18 -0.13 -0.04 -0.08 -0.14 1.00 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on NCRB data. #Persons Arrested 
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Mathematical Appendix: Random Effects versus Fixed Effects Model 
Regarding the identification of the effects model, we conducted the Hausman specification 
test. The result of this test is obtained by using STATA-11 and is presented in table-A.4 below. 
 
Table-A.4: Hausman Test to Choose Between Random Effect and Fixed Effect Model 
 














ln(Poverty) 0.412 0.275 0.137 0.349 
ln(NSDP) -0.236 0.225 -0.461 0.472 
ln(FLR) 0.861 0.314 0.547 0.689 
ln(Police) 0.111 0.109 0.003 0.269 
ln(TPE) -0.112 -0.239 0.126 0.113 
ln(SR) -6.417 -4.261 -2.156 6.151 
ln(SC) -0.196 -0.120 -0.077 0.195 
ln(ST) 0.031 -0.216 0.247 0.174 
ln(FWPR) 0.229 0.565 -0.336 0.591 
ln(Persons 
Arrested) -0.126 0.218 -0.344 0.314 
ln(Urban) -0.372 -0.252 -0.120 0.449 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on NCRB data. *Evidence shows Random Effect model 
is appropriate 
 
The null hypothesis related to Hausman test is that the Random Effects Model is 
appropriate. Table-3 shows that the values of the
2
12  are 6.99 with degrees of freedom 12 and the 
corresponding Prob
2 value is 0.8581. Thus, we accept null hypothesis which indicates Random 
Effects Model will be appropriate in our case. 
